Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy
Volume 4
Issue 1 Festschrift II in Honor of Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer on the Occasion of His
Retirement: International Perspectives on Urban
Law & Policy

Article 15

2020

Municipal Bonds in Three Countries: India, South Africa and the
United States
Matt Glasser
Director for Municipal Law and Finance at the Centre for Urban Law and Finance in Africa (CULFA) and
Extraordinary Research Fellow of the Chair for Law, Justice and Sustainability of North-West University in
Potchesfstroom, South Africa, matthewdglasser@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Land Use Law
Commons, and the Urban Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Glasser, Matt (2020) "Municipal Bonds in Three Countries: India, South Africa and the United States,"
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 15, 96-132.
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information,
please contact gfowke@gsu.edu.

Glasser: Municipal Bonds in Three Countries

MUNICIPAL BONDS IN THREE COUNTRIES: INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE UNITED STATES
Matt Glasser*
BACKGROUND
When Alexander Hamilton was asked to take on the financial challenges of a young
United States, he recognized the need for capital to invest in the country’s future.
A recent book introduces Hamilton’s impact this way:
During his relatively short life …, Hamilton…went on as the nation’s
first Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 to 1795 to engineer the U.S.
financial revolution. He did so to promote economic growth and
national power. He was ahead of his time. Indeed, since we have only
of late come to appreciate what he knew long ago about finance’s or
credit’s connection to growth and power, he remained ahead of his time
right down to the present.1
New York’s capital markets, which Hamilton helped establish, can take credit for
financing the bulk of local infrastructure in the U.S. over the past one hundred
years. In 1812, New York City issued the first general obligation (GO) municipal
bond to finance the building of a canal. 2 Outstanding debt of U.S. local
governments had reached $200 million by 1860, and $516 million by 1870. 3
Today, the U.S. municipal bond market stands at about $3.8 trillion dollars. 4

* Director for Municipal Law and Finance at the Centre for Urban Law and Finance in Africa
(CULFA) and Extraordinary Research Fellow of the Chair for Law, Justice and Sustainability of
North-West University in Potchesfstroom, South Africa.
1

R. Sylla and D. Cowen, Alexander Hamilton on Finance, Credit and Debt, Columbia University
Press (2018), page 1
2

Malanga, Steven. "The Muni-Bond Debt Bomb... and how to dismantle it." City Journal 20.3
(2010).
3

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory
Restrictions on Local Government Debt (1961), page 16.
4

Investor Bulletin: The Municipal Securities Market https://www.investor.gov/additionalresources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-municipal-securities-market, retrieved 8
December 2019
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Largely because of the enduring success of the U.S. municipal bond model,
attempts have been made over the past two decades to establish municipal bond
markets in developing countries. This article traces developments in South Africa
and India. Comparing the situation in these two countries with one another, and
with the long-established municipal bond market in the United States, we explore
how context affects outcomes. In development circles, it is widely accepted that
municipal bonds and other credit arrangements can help finance essential local
infrastructure.
I hope to demonstrate that the political, institutional and regulatory environment
that empowers or constrains the use of municipal bonds and other borrowing tools
is complex, and that municipal bonds are not magic. For municipal bonds per se to
be a sustainable infrastructure financing mechanism, local government must be
creditworthy and there must be a helpful institutional, legal and regulatory
framework.5 Citizens must want and expect their local government to provide
services and infrastructure, and they must expect to pay for it. Local government
must have adequate powers and financial instruments to deliver on their citizens’
expectations.
NATIONAL DIFFERENCES
Significant contrasts. These three countries differ in size, wealth, and
governmental structure. India has by far the largest population, with over 1.3 billion
people. This is four times the population of the United States, and more than 20
times the population of South Africa. The United States is a high-income country,
with a per capita GDP of US $62,641; South Africa is a middle-income country,
with a per capita GDP of US $6,374; and India is a lower middle-income country,
with a per capita GDP of $2,016.6 India and the U.S. are federal countries, in which
the powers of local government units depend entirely on state laws. By contrast,
South Africa is a unitary country, with significant decentralization in the local
sphere. These differences have consequences for the state of the municipal bond
market in each country, and for the market’s future development.
Indian urban local bodies (ULBs) have limited powers and functions. In 1992,
the 74th Amendment to the Indian Constitution recognized, and attempted to
empower, urban local government, noting that “in many States local bodies have
5

Local governments which are not creditworthy can borrow with a government guarantee, but
such borrowing should be thought of as state or national borrowing, since that is where the risk
actually lies.
6

World Bank estimates for 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
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become weak and ineffective…[and] are not able to perform effectively as vibrant
democratic units of self-government.”7 However, the 74th Amendment left it to
each state to enact enabling legislation and to provide ULB finances. Within India’s
federal structure, it is up to the states to determine the powers, functions, and
revenues of ULBs. Most Indian states have failed to devolve significant authority
and revenues to these bodies. The lack of a stable and reliable financial base has
naturally constrained borrowing by ULBs, despite episodic enthusiasm for
municipal bonds. India is comprised of 29 States and seven Union Territories. The
States have considerable autonomy, while the Union Territories are governed
centrally.8 Many Indian states are larger than countries in other parts of the world,
so the concept of meaningful decentralization of functions and finances has merit,
but it remains far from realization. Most infrastructure is installed through statecontrolled channels, and most subnational borrowing is state-level borrowing.
South African municipalities have considerable responsibility and autonomy.
South Africa is small, compared to India and the U.S. Its 257 municipalities have
extensive, constitutionally specified powers and functions, are responsible for local
land use regulation, and are largely responsible for planning, constructing,
operating, and maintaining local infrastructure. Municipal powers do not depend
on provincial legislation or fiscal transfers. South Africa’s largest cities have strong
economies and own-source revenue bases. Poorer, rural municipalities rely more
on transfers from national government. Municipalities’ legally authorized revenue
instruments (primarily property taxes and tariffs on water and electricity), together
with equalizing transfers from national government, are broadly adequate to the
functional responsibilities of municipalities, and in principle provide a solid
foundation to borrow for infrastructure investment. However, there are now
significant financial problems in many municipalities. These are mostly
attributable to poor financial management, rather than the underlying fiscal
framework.
U.S. local government is meaningfully decentralized. Like India, the U.S. is a
federal country, and state legislation determines the powers, functions, and finances
of local government units. Despite this nominal similarity, U.S. municipalities are
generally autonomous to an extent that is distinctly unlike India, and without many
7

Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution Seventy-fourth Amendment Act,
1992
8

Delhi is something of an exception. In Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi vs.
Union of India, CA No. 2357 of 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that the National Capital
Territory’s government has substantial legislative and executive powers, and is not subject to the
control of the center in most matters.
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parallels in the world. There are over 90,000 local governments in the U.S., 9
including a proliferation of cities, counties, school districts, water districts, fire
districts, and other special districts and institutions, most of which have locally
elected councils or boards, significant locally determined revenues and
expenditures, and the ability to borrow for capital investment. Debt securities issued
by any of these local entities are thought of as “municipal bonds,” even when the
issuer is not a municipality per se. Most infrastructure and service delivery in the
U.S. is organized and financed at the local level.
MUNICIPAL BOND ISSUERS
Each country’s laws and regulations impact on municipal borrowers and bond
issuers. Analytically, it is useful to start with the functions that local government
in each country is legally authorised or mandated to perform, the infrastructure
investments for which it is responsible, its authority to borrow, the revenues legally
available to repay its debt, and its authority to pledge revenues and assets to secure
debt. Laws and regulations relating to financial management, accounting, and
reporting help support transparency and an informed, efficient marketplace. In
addition to these issues, which directly affect municipal borrowers and bond
issuers, we should consider legislation related to capital markets, taxation, and
remedies available to creditors. This article attempts to survey and identify these
issues for comparative purposes, but is not intended as an in-depth treatise on
municipal bonds in any of the three countries.
Local governments differ in their functions, and thus their need for debt
finance. The functions that a local government unit performs, and the infrastructure
it is consequently expected to finance, fundamentally influence its need to borrow
for investment. There are 29 states in India, and 50 in the United States. These
states in both countries are diverse, with a wide variety of economies, politics, and
histories. Local government powers and functions vary from state to state in these
two countries, and sometimes within a state. Although India and the U.S. are both
federal countries, the powers and functions of U.S. cities are generally far greater
than those of Indian cities, and typically include responsibility for building,
operating, and maintaining most public infrastructure in urban areas. In both India
and the U.S., it is not unusual to see parallel authorities, districts, and entities that
are charged with building some types of urban infrastructure, and these entities do
borrow to finance such investments. In India, these are usually controlled by the

9

US Census Bureau, 2017 Government Units Survey (accessed 7 December 2019 at
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gus.html).
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state, whereas in the U.S., these are usually separate and autonomous entities. 10 By
contrast with India and the U.S., South Africa has one set of national laws that apply
to all municipalities, and municipalities largely have the same functions throughout
the country, with the qualification that outside of the eight large metropolitan
municipalities, local government functions are divided between two levels:
relatively compact local municipalities and larger district municipalities (each of
which includes several local municipalities). Unlike the other two countries, South
Africa does not have parallel authorities responsible for infrastructure investment,
though some functions can be organized as municipally owned enterprises.
Local governments differ in their ability to service debt.
Financial
sustainability, including debt carrying capacity, depends on the revenues available
to meet local government’s responsibilities. Three kinds of revenue can play a role:
local taxes, local fees and charges, and intergovernmental transfers or revenuesharing. If these three legs are adequate and stable, the financial sustainability of
local government further depends on revenue management and expenditure control.
Municipal bonds are generally neither possible nor desirable in the absence of
stable and predictable local budgets, annual operating surpluses, and clear
prioritization of infrastructure needs.
Own-source revenue instruments are especially important.
Although
borrowing against future intergovernmental transfers and revenue sharing is
possible, own-source revenues collected by local government from residents and
businesses seem to be the real key to servicing debt obligations sustainably. The
authorized own source revenue instruments (taxes, fees, and charges) vary from
state to state in the federal structures of India and the U.S., whereas own source
revenue instruments are the same for all South African municipalities.
In all three countries, property taxes are a main driver of local government
debt-carrying capacity. Property taxes are an unconditional revenue source, which
can be used for any legitimate local government purpose. They are therefore
especially important in considering local government’s ability to sustain itself and
successfully issue municipal bonds. Property taxes account for 72 percent of

10

In the US, such entities’ functions usually extend beyond the boundaries of a single
municipality, and may include several municipalities, as well as unincorporated areas. Examples
include transport and water authorities, and school and fire protection districts. Examples in India
include development authorities that are often focused on a single city, and water or transport
authorities that may serve several ULBs as well as rural areas.
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local government tax collections in the U.S.,11 60 percent in India,12 and virtually
all local taxes in South Africa.13 In the U.S., local government in most states is
authorized to impose sales and use taxes, and in some states municipalities are
authorized to impose local income taxes. 14 In India, some ULBs impose utility
taxes, property transfer taxes, and development charges, but these generate little
revenue per capita compared to South Africa and the U.S. Prior to the 2017
adoption of the Goods and Services Tax, Indian ULBs imposed a range of luxury
taxes, octroi and other entry taxes, advertising taxes, and various surcharges and
cesses, but national Goods and Services Tax (GST) legislation 15 has recently
abolished these taxes, with dramatic impact on the budgets of some ULBs. 16
User charges can support bonds to finance infrastructure. 17 In general, user
charges for services such as water and sanitation services and electricity are more
than enough to cover operating costs in the U.S., but they rarely cover even
operating costs in India or South Africa. The corollary is that in the U.S.,
municipalities and other local service entities rely on user charge revenues to
support municipal bonds issued to finance utility infrastructure, and can finance
investments using revenue bonds, with debt service paid entirely from user charges

11

2016 data from US Census Bureau, retrieved 2 January 2020 at
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/tables/2016/summarytables/16slsstab1a.xlsx
12

2017-18 data from Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, State of
Municipal Finances in India, Study Prepared for the Fifteenth Finance Commission, 2019,
retrieved 2 January 2020 at
https://fincomindia.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/fincom15/StudyReports/State%20of%20M
unicipal%20Finances%20in%20India.pdf
13

While property tax is the only municipal tax in South Africa, it makes up less than 25% of
municipalities’ own-source revenues, which include charges for water, electricity and other
services. See StatsSA, “Quarterly financial statistics of municipalities,” June 2019, retrieved 2
January 2020 at http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P9110&SCH=7625
14

A helpful chart showing which states allow which local taxes is contained in Figure 2 of
Reschovsky, Andrew. "The Tax Autonomy of Local Governments in the United States." (2019).
15

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017,
Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; and Goods and Services Tax (Compensation
to States) Act, 2017.
16

A case study describing the impact of this legislation in Mumbai provides some useful insights:
Mankikar, S, “The Impact of GST on Municipal Finances in India: A Case Study of Mumbai,”
Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief, September 2018, Issue No. 257
17

See Ebel, R.D. & Wang, Y. 2018, User Charges to Fund State and Local Infrastructure Services,
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, St. Louis.
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and connection charges. In South Africa and India, such revenue surpluses are rare,
and this is a major barrier to a sustainable market for municipal bonds.
Formula based, unconditional fiscal transfers can also support bonds. In
places where the economic base for local taxes, fees and charges is insufficient for
the minimum functions local government must perform, local bodies must rely on
intergovernmental transfers. For infrastructure funding, such transfers often take
the form of conditional grants, with transfers dedicated to support specific projects
or programmes.18 The strengths and weaknesses of such conditional transfers are
beyond the scope of this article. However, if transfers are predictable, formulabased and unconditional, and there is a reasonable expectation that they will
continue for the indefinite future, local government can leverage intergovernmental
transfer flows by pledging them to service debt, as with any other future revenues.
Indian ULBs depend on transfers from national and state governments.
India’s intergovernmental fiscal architecture relies on Central and State Finance
Commissions to meet every five years and make recommendations for transfers to
local government units. The Central Finance Commission recommendations are
usually accepted by the Union government. For the period 2015-2020, Central
Finance Commission allocation to ULBs amounted to just over $7 per capita, per
year.19 While states have had a generally poor record of compliance with the fiveyear requirement for State Finance Commissions,20 the eventual amounts
recommended by State Finance Commissions – an average of $16 per capita per
year over the last four years – are more than the transfers allocated by the Central
Finance Commission.21 Both Central and State Finance Commission allocations to
local government units have been rising over time. These transfers are substantial,
and if the Finance Commissions were to structure these transfers in a more
permanent, predictable, and unconditional way, ULBs could usefully leverage them
18

India’s urban schemes are an example: there have been a series of central government schemes
to support investment in cities. JNNURM, in 2005, was in principle aimed at promoting
financially sustainable and accountable ULBs and parastatals. A core idea was to offer funds for
capital investment in exchange for specified reforms. This approach was largely continued with
the 2015 AMRUT and Smart Cities Schemes. Although there are some incentives for municipal
bonds provided in the AMRUT schemes, the conditionality of these funds renders them unsuitable
to support long term borrowing.
19

Author’s calculation based on a total grant of Rs 87,143.80 crore, then equivalent to about $14
billion, spread over five years.
20

Manish Gupta and Pinaki Chakraborty, State Finance Commissions: How effective have they
been in empowering local governments? NIPFP Work Paper No. 263, April 30, 2019
21

Ibid, Table 3, author’s currency conversion
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through municipal bond issues or other borrowing, to accelerate urban
infrastructure investment.
South African local government receives transfers of two kinds. First, South
Africa municipalities benefit from a constitutionally mandated “equitable share” of
national revenues. The equitable share formula is complex, but mostly driven by
population and poverty. Poorer, more rural municipalities, which have less ownsource revenue potential, receive more equitable share funding per capita than
more urban municipalities. The equitable share transfers are unconditional and can
be used for any legitimate local government purpose. Second, municipalities
receive conditional grants of many kinds, which have proliferated and grown
substantially over the last fifteen years, and are dedicated to specific uses. South
Africa has permitted municipalities to pledge equitable share transfers to secure
borrowing since 2003,22 and government has recently announced that it will remove
language requiring the approval of the National Treasury for a pledge of conditional
transfers. The previous restriction on pledging of conditional transfers is being
removed specifically so that municipalities can leverage these revenue flows,
subject to the conditions of the grants.23 Until recently, there had been limited
pledging of conditional transfers, but only for the three years of government’s
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework.
In the U.S., state transfers to municipalities are significant, but not
predictable. While states’ transfers to local governments have gone up and down
over the last decade, over the longer term there has been an increasing trend. 36%
of local government revenues come from intergovernmental transfers, the
overwhelming majority of which are transfers from the states to local government. 24
Unpredictable transfers are not suitable for long term leveraging, though some
municipalities have borrowed against expected near-term transfers.

22

Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003, Section 48(2)(e)

23

Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing, 2017 Update, retrieved 25 January 2020 at
https://csp.treasury.gov.za/Resource%20_Centre/Conferences/Documents/DFI%20Day/Municipal
%20Borrowing%20Policy%20Framework%20update%2030%20Dec%202017%20(Draft).pdf
24

In 2016, 36 percent of US local government’s general revenue came from intergovernmental
transfers; 88 percent of transfers came from state governments (including indirect federal funds)
and 12 percent came directly from the federal government. Urban Institute, State and Local Tax
Initiative, retrieved 1 January 2020 at https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-centerinitiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-localrevenues#local
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1. India
India has over 4,000 ULBs that might theoretically issue bonds, as well as a
large number of state-created development authorities, water and sewerage boards,
and other entities responsible for investment in urban infrastructure. The borrowing
powers of ULBs and other entities depend entirely on state legislation. State laws
typically include rules as to what entities may borrow, how much, for what purpose,
for what term, and subject to what processes and approvals. A 2011 World Bank
study undertook a detailed review of the laws in four states, and concluded that in
these states, ULB borrowing requires the approval of the state government, usually
on a case-by-case basis, and this can often take six months or more. The research
showed that “in all cases where some sort of substantive, merit-based scrutiny of
the proposed loan transaction is conducted, there are no clear criteria governing the
assessment (or at least none which are clearly documented and understood by the
applicant ULB or investors). The process through which the assessment is
conducted is highly opaque, and there is no mandated timing.” 25 After state
approval, ULB councils must approve the borrowing through a resolution passed at
a special meeting convened specifically for the purpose of approving the proposed
borrowing.26 In 2017, the Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, in
their Annual Survey of India's City-Systems (ASICS) 27 found that only 4 out of 23
ULBs surveyed are authorized to borrow money without state or central
government approval.
The power to issue bonds is meaningless without stable, predictable and
adequate revenues that can be used for repayment. In 1993, the 74th Amendment
to the Indian Constitution recognised ULBs as a third tier of government, and
provided that a state legislature may devolve to ULBs the responsibility for
specified matters, but it left actual devolution of these matters to the states.28
Moreover, ULBs’ power to levy taxes and fees also requires specific state

25

World Bank, Developing a Regulatory Framework for Municipal Borrowing in India, Vol. 1,
2011, page 28; retrieved 12 January 2020 at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/132101468281673152/-Main-report
26

World Bank, Developing a Regulatory Framework for Municipal Borrowing in India, Vol. 1,
2011, page 107; retrieved 12 January 2020 at http://docments.worldbank.org/curated/en/506141468042303569/Annexure-one-to-seven
27

Available at http://www.janaagraha.org/asics/ASICS-2017.html

28

Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, section 243W

Published by Reading Room, 2020

104

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 15

legislation.29 Local autonomy to formulate tax policy is severely limited, 30 and
there are many rebates and exemptions, including a Constitutional prohibition on
taxing property of the Union Government. 31 As a result, property tax collections in
India, amounting to 0.14% of GDP, are significantly lower than in other developing
countries, let alone OECD countries. 32
Most states have failed to provide ULBs with stable, predictable and adequate
revenues. Such revenues could be provided either by authorizing ULBs to use
robust own-source revenue instruments or by providing predictable, unconditional
transfers or revenue sharing from state revenues. The finances of ULBs are
generally anemic by global standards, and this is one bottleneck that has constrained
the development of the municipal bond market. After the 74th Amendment was
adopted, there were still various state and local taxes (e.g. VAT, luxury taxes, octroi
and other entry taxes, advertising taxes, and various surcharges and cesses) that
raised revenue for ULBs. Since then, many of these have been eliminated, and from
2017 ULB finances faced a new challenge when Goods and Services Tax (GST)
legislation abolished these local taxes. A case study describing the impact of this
legislation in Mumbai provides some useful insights. 33
State guarantees of municipal bonds in India are common, but not the rule.
The 1998 bond issue by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was noteworthy
because it was the first ULB to issue a bond without a state guarantee. In 1997
there had been a municipal bond issue by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation,
but it was backed by a guarantee from the state of Karnataka. 34 Subsequent
guaranteed municipal bond issues include a 2000 private placement bond issued by
the Indore Municipal Corporation in Madhya Pradesh, a 2003 issue by the Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board in Tamil Nadu, a 2005 issue by
the Chennai Municipal Corporation, a 2005 issue by the Karnataka Water and
Sanitation Pooled Fund, and a 2018 issue by the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region

29

Id., section 243X; see also P. K. Mohanty, “Give cities a share of GST to make them viable,”
http://www.civilsocietyonline.com/cities/give-cities-a-share-of-gst-to-make-them-viable/
30

Om Prakash Mathur, Property Tax and Municipal Finance in India, 2020

31

Art. 285, Constitution of India

32

Om Prakash Mathur, supra, at pp. 10-11

33

Mankikar, S, “The Impact of GST on Municipal Finances in India: A Case Study of Mumbai,”
ORF Issue Brief, September 2018, Issue No. 257
34

Urbanisation in India: Challenges, Opportunities and the Way Forward, edited by Isher Judge
Ahluwalia, Ravi Kanbur, P. K. Mohanty
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Development Authority.35 The state guarantee seems to be more common for nonULB “municipal bonds,” which is logical, since these bonds are, in any event,
issued by state entities.
ULBs can pledge collateral to lenders, but this may be of dubious value. State
laws generally authorize ULBs to pledge immovable property owned by the ULB
and revenue from taxes, fees, and levies imposed by the ULB. 36 However, it is not
clear how investors would enforce such pledges. Only some states provide for
attachment of ULB funds in the event of a default, and this can only be done through
application to the state government (rather than e.g. through a court process). There
are no state laws authorizing the attachment of ULB property in order to enforce
lenders’ rights.37 It is not completely clear that the default provisions apply to bondholders (as opposed to lenders), but even assuming that they do, there are practical
problems of enforcement: no individual bondholder is likely to have enough of a
stake to warrant the time and expense required to initiate an attachment process. If
one bond-holder does so, it is not clear what the consequences would be for other
bond-holders. Some states have authorized ULBs to create special purpose escrow
accounts that divert specific revenues for the benefit of creditors, 38 and these
arrangements appear to provide more security to bondholders, and to allow for less
political interference in the enforcement of legal rights.
2. South Africa
South Africa has 257 municipalities, of which 53 are potential bond issuers.
The term “municipality” can be misleading to those unfamiliar with the country,
because it does not signify an urban area. South African municipalities are “wallto-wall,” i.e. they cover the entire country, and include both urban and rural areas
in varying proportions.39 There is a great deal of economic inequality between
municipalities, and many municipalities in rural areas do not have a substantial
own-source revenue base. Although there is no legal barrier to bond issuance by
the poorest municipalities, the most optimistic count of potential municipal bond
issuers would include the eight Category A metropolitan municipalities, the 19
35

This information was compiled by Mathangi Chandrasekhar, of the Janaagraha Centre for
Citizenship and Democracy.
36

Ibid

37

Ibid

38

Ibid, page 108

39

Unlike India’s states, South Africa’s provinces have little authority over municipalities, and
provincial infrastructure responsibilities are largely in the health and education sectors.
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Category B1 municipalities (which house secondary cities), and the 26 Category
B2 municipalities (which contain large towns). Of these 53 potential bond issuers,
only four have actually issued municipal bonds since the democratic era that began
in 1994.40
Municipal borrowing powers are governed by national legislation,41 and are not
subject to any regulatory or approval processes at the provincial level. Key
provisions of South African legislation include 1) authority for an elected council
to bind the municipality (and future councils) to repay debt; 42 2) limitations as to
the purpose of long-term borrowing – municipalities may incur-long term debt only
for “capital expenditure on property, plant or equipment to be used for the purpose
of achieving the objects of local government,” and in certain circumstances for refinancing existing long-term debt;43 3) procedures to ensure the council has
considered the implications of borrowing, informed the public in advance, provided
an opportunity for comment, 44 and disclosed all information that may be material
to a prospective lender or investor; 45 and 4) limitations as to the currency which
may be borrowed (municipal debts must be denominated in South African Rands
and not indexed to any foreign currency).46 Procedurally, a municipal bond issue
in South Africa is authorized by resolution of the municipal council, signed by the
mayor.47 The debt agreement itself must the signed by the accounting officer of the
municipality.48
There are no state or national guarantees for municipal bonds in South Africa.
Bond buyers must base their investment decisions on their own judgments about
the creditworthiness of South African municipalities, and understand that there are
no provincial or national guarantees. Bond investors and other lenders are therefore
not willing to extend credit to municipalities that are unlikely to be able to repay
40

A fifth metropolitan municipality, eThekwini, has indicated that it will soon issue its first
municipal bond.
41

Chapter 6 of the Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003

42

Section 230A, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended by the Sixth
Amendment Act of 2001
43

Section 46, Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003 (MFMA)

44

Section 46 (3), MFMA

45

Section 49, MFMA

46

Section 47(a), MFMA

47

Section 46(2)(a), MFMA

48

Section 46(2)(b), MFMA
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their debt obligations. It is clear to all that credit extended to municipalities “will
not be guaranteed by the central fiscus.”49 There are no binding restrictions on the
amount of debt that a municipality can incur, though the South African National
Treasury has issued guidelines suggesting that a municipality’s outstanding debt
should not exceed 45% of operating revenues, and that debt service should be
between 6% and 8% of operating expenditure. 50 This reliance on investors’ due
diligence in the municipal sector has prevented the cycle of spiraling, unsustainable
debt and bailouts that has affected many of South Africa’s SOEs, which did receive
national government guarantees for their borrowings.
Municipalities can provide bondholders with a wide range of security
interests. Municipalities are authorized to give liens, pledges, mortgages, cessions,
and to otherwise hypothecate an asset or to give other forms of collateral; to deposit
funds as security; to dedicate specific revenue streams to payment of debts; to retain
various revenue streams at specified levels; and more. 51 The key constraint is that
if a municipal council agrees to any of these security arrangements, it must either
determine that the asset or right being pledged is not necessary for providing a
minimum level of basic municipal services; or if it is necessary, the council must
indicate the manner in which the availability of the asset or right will be protected. 52
3. United States
There are more than 90,000 local government units in the U.S.53 Not all of
these issue bonds, but most do. According to an industry advocacy group, there are
nearly 50,000 municipal bond issuers in the United States. This includes states and
general purpose local governments such as cities, towns and counties, as well as a
wide variety of special districts and authorities, such as school districts, water and
sanitation districts, and other special purpose entities. 54 The overwhelming
majority of these local government units are creditworthy, and the main reason that
the remaining 40,000 have not issued municipal bonds is that they have relatively

49

Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing and Financial Emergencies, adopted by Cabinet
December 2000, retrieved 11 January 2020 at https://www.gov.za/documents/municipalborrowing-and-financial-emergencies-policy-framework
50

Uniform Financial Ratios and Norms January 2014, National Treasury MFMA Circular No. 71
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Subsection 2 of Section 48, MFMA
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Subsection 2 of Section 48, MFMA
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https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html

54

Municipal Bonds for America, https://munibondsforamerica.org/resources/
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small operating budgets and investment needs, compared to the relatively high
fixed costs of bond issuance.
Some municipal borrowing requires voter approval. Many states require voter
approval for any general obligation (GO) borrowing. Some states allow lower
levels of borrowing on council’s authorization alone, but require voter approval for
higher levels of borrowing. As one example, Washington State allows municipal
councils to authorize general obligation debt up to 1.5% of the assessed valuation
of properties in the municipality, requires voter approval of additional debt up to a
total of 5% of assessed valuation, and allows an additional 5% over that cap in the
case of debt approved by voters and to be used specifically for water, lights, and
sewers when those facilities are owned and controlled by the municipality.55
Issuance of a municipal bond, subject to voter approval if required, is authorized
by resolution or ordinance of the municipal council or other governing body. The
specific requirements depend on state legislation, and sometimes on the provisions
of a home-rule charter. The resolution or ordinance specifies the purpose of the
bond issue, the number, denomination, and term of the bonds to be issued, when
payments of principal and interest will be made, and the security arrangements,
pledges, and covenants that are undertaken for the benefit of bondholders.
Voter approval may be required for GO bonds, but not for revenue bonds. In
the case of GO bonds, the full faith and credit of the municipality is obligated, i.e.
the municipality is obligated to pay bondholders from whatever taxes are necessary,
and whatever other funds it can access, including those would require increasing
the rate of property tax. In the case of revenue bonds, bondholders can look only
to specified revenue streams, e.g. water service charges, road and bridge tolls, etc.
for repayment. In general, the authority of municipalities to issue GO bonds is
more limited than for revenue bonds, since citizens are felt to need protection from
the risk of increased property taxes.
“Iowa in 1857 and Illinois in 1870 had adopted constitutions which
set limits on local government debt in terms of a percentage of
assessed value. Widespread adoption of this and other types of
constitutional restrictions on the borrowing powers of local
governments came as an aftermath of the crisis of the 1870's. Within
a very few years, some such provisions were placed in the
constitutions of a majority of the States. Nearly as promptly also,
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Wash. Const., Art. 8 §6
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various devices and legal doctrines were developed to limit or
circumvent effects of such provisions.”56
The use of proceeds may be restricted to purely public purposes. Because
American cities are “creatures of the state”57 we look to state laws to understand
municipal borrowing powers, restrictions, and procedural requirements. Some
rules are found in state constitutions, others in ordinary legislation, and still others
in city charters.58 Some restrictions came into being in the 19th century, following
several municipal financial crises connected with railroad investments and loans.
Hoping to ensure that their citizens were well-connected to the developing national
rail network, counties and municipalities incurred debt to support railroad
construction, but many companies went bankrupt, and lines were abandoned. This
left some local governments in a precarious financial position, and resulted in a
wave of restrictions on municipal investment in support of private enterprise. 59 A
typical example provides that:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, township or school
district shall lend or pledge the credit or faith thereof, directly or
indirectly, in any manner to, or in aid of, any person, company or
corporation, public or private, for any amount, or for any purpose
whatever; or become responsible for any debt, contract or liability
of any person, company or corporation, public or private, in or out
of the state.60
North Carolina is the only U.S. state requiring prior approval of municipal
borrowing. Municipalities in North Carolina are required to apply to the State’s
Local Government Commission before they issue debt. The Commission “works
with local governments to determine the necessity of a project, the size of the issue,
and the most expedient form of financing, then guides all projects through a
rigorous review to ensure the financing meets all statutory requirements. The Debt
Management Section oversees the sale and issuance of all local government debt,
56

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory
Restrictions on Local Government Debt (1961), page 21
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See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980)
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See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory
Restrictions on Local Government Debt (1961)
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Pinsky, David E. "State constitutional limitations on public industrial financing: an historical
and economic approach." U. Pa. L. Rev. 111 (1962): 265
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then monitors repayment of debt and issues debt notices required under statute.” 61
The Commission was originally established during the Great Depression to help
local governments in North Carolina work out of their debt difficulties. Thereafter,
it has remained in place to control and facilitate local debt operations.
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKETS
The municipal bond market is a segment within national financial markets.
Financial markets in any country include debt instruments (bonds) and equities
(company shares). When local government issues a municipal bond, it is offering a
debt security that competes for investors’ capital with other debt securities. In each
of these countries, the dominant bond issuer is the national government, and these
sovereign bonds are seen by investors as the least risky investment. Corporate and
municipal bonds are therefore typically priced in reference to, i.e. at a “spread”
over, a benchmark sovereign bond.
Creditworthiness is subjective. The spread over sovereign debt that a municipal
bond issuer must offer depends on buyers’ perceptions of the issuer’s
creditworthiness relative to that of the national government. Creditworthiness has
both qualitative and quantitative elements, and the judgment that ultimately matters
is that of bond buyers.62 Municipal bond credit ratings are assigned by ratings
agencies, whose business it is to evaluate credit risk, i.e. they undertake research
and offer their opinions about the likelihood that a bond issuer will pay its credit
obligations as and when due. These credit ratings can be helpful to bond buyers,
especially in a market with many investment vehicles and many investors, such as
the U.S. market. In all three countries, institutional fund managers are generally
required to invest in instruments with a minimum credit rating. However, many
institutional investors view a credit rating as only a starting point, and do at least
some research and evaluation of their own. Note that rating agencies have no direct
risk exposure if a municipality defaults, and global experience shows that rating
agency judgements are often reactive rather than predictive. 63
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https://www.nctreasurer.com/state-and-local-government-finance-division/local-governmentcommission, retrieved January 25 2020
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If bond insurance or third-party guarantees are involved, then another relevant judgement is that
of the insurer or other entity bearing the risk of municipal default.
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Bussiere, M and Ristiniemi, A, Credit Ratings and Debt Crises (September 1, 2012). Banque de
France Working Paper No. 396,
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Investors and rating agencies emphasize various factors in arriving at
assessments of creditworthiness and the ratings they assign. There is no single,
standard rating methodology. Ultimately, bond buyers want to be paid, and so they
are interested in issuers that have been evaluated as managing their operations and
finances well, that report their financial positions accurately, and that have stable
operating surpluses, i.e. revenues that are consistently more than operational
spending requirements. Although investors and rating agencies do use various
financial ratios in forming judgements about creditworthiness, the probability of a
default cannot be calculated with mathematical precision, as many factors come
into play.64 In South Africa and the U.S., audited municipal financial statements
are reliable and readily available. Municipal finance data in India is still much
harder to come by, although some states have made progress in standardizing
municipal accounting and financial reporting.
Local government borrowing in the form of loans is most common in India
and South Africa. Municipal bonds are the focus of this article, but the dominance
of direct lending in India and South Africa should be mentioned, and has several
implications: first, it is financial institutions, rather than individuals, that are the
primary investors in municipal debt in these countries. Second, loans are usually
held to maturity by the institution that makes the loan. Third, loans are usually
repaid in a series of payments over time, each of which includes interest on the
unpaid principal balance, plus a portion of the principal, whereas bonds usually
feature a semi-annual payment of interest, with the entire principal due at
maturity.65 Finally, the predominance of loans, and the small stock of municipal
bonds means that there is not a significant secondary market in either India or South
Africa. Municipal bonds rarely trade, even though they are designed to be tradeable.
Most municipal bonds end up being treated much like loans, in that they are initially
bought by banks and other financial institutions, which mostly hold the bonds to
maturity. There seem to be few individual holders of municipal bonds in India and
South Africa.
Bonds are the dominant form of municipal borrowing in the U.S. Because
municipal bonds are issued in relatively small denominations ($5,000 is typical in
the United States), they are able to attract the savings of small investors. The
64

For one example of how issuers are rated, see Moody’s Investor Service, Rating Methodology,
Regional and Local Governments, at
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_1072625, retrieved
Dec. 8 2019.
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primary market for municipal bonds is one of the largest financial markets in the
U.S.66 Nearly half of all municipal bonds are held by individual investors, and
another quarter of the stock is held by mutual funds, with the remainder mostly
divided between financial institutions and insurance companies. 67 This pattern of
investors is possible because of the highly liquid nature of the U.S. bond market.
In a liquid market, a bondholder that wants or needs to cash out a municipal bond
can readily find a buyer, absent extraordinary circumstances. And this diversity of
investors, many of which have long-term investment horizons, means that U.S.
municipalities are not dependent on bank lending. This is becoming a more obvious
advantage, since banks world-wide are increasingly being regulated to limit
liquidity risk. Long-term municipal bonds are not a natural asset for commercial
banks holding demand or short-term deposits.
In principle, long-term municipal bonds can be attractive to private and public
financial institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, investment fund
managers, sovereign wealth funds, and individual investors. An advantage of
bonds, from the perspective of investors, is that investment is scalable. A
household with some savings can buy a bond or two, a wealthy individual can
accumulate a diverse portfolio of municipal bonds, and institutional investors can
buy as many as they need. Long term municipal bonds are an especially good fit
for U.S. investors, where banks hold relatively few municipal bonds. In South
Africa and India, local government borrowers have not issued many long-term
bonds, partly because of demand side limitations, and partly because there are
relatively few institutional investors seeking long term municipal debt instruments.
The longest bond maturities in both countries are 15 years, and 10 years or less is
common. In the U.S., 30 year maturities are common, and low interest rates in
recent years have led to several municipal bond issues with 50-year and even 100year maturities.
1. India
In India, the total municipal bond market is only about US $200 million,68 out
of an estimated $1.7 trillion national debt securities market. This extremely small
municipal share is dwarfed by the market share of state debt securities, which is
66

Cestau, Dario. "Competition and Market Concentration in the Municipal Bond
Market." Available at SSRN 3497599 (2019).
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SIFMA, Quarterly Breakdown of Municipal Outstanding by Bond Holder Type, retrieved
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more than 2,000 times larger. The share of national government securities in the
market is double the state figure.69 Indian ULBs’ bond debt comes to only about
US $0.15 per capita, and state level securities add another US $309 per capita,
which means that subnational borrowing accounts for about 15% of Indian per
capita GDP. State debt securities are the significant subnational phenomenon in
India, not municipal bonds. Since, ultimately, municipal and state debt rely
primarily on overlapping underlying economic bases for repayment, there will be a
limit as to how much the municipal bond market for any given state’s ULBs could
be sustainably expanded without a concomitant reduction in the state’s own longterm debt.
Municipal bonds in India are listed on the national securities exchange.
Accordingly, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has issued
regulations that relate to the listing and trading of municipal bonds. 70 A World
Bank study has concluded that “SEBI rules regarding the listing of municipal bonds
and public disclosure requirements are derived mainly from the corporate sector
and are inappropriate in some respects for municipal instruments.”71 These
regulations provide, inter alia, that issuers of listed municipal bonds must meet
specified criteria including surplus income in one of the three previous years, and
the absence of loan or bond defaults for at least the previous year. 72 These are not
very demanding requirements. Investors and lenders, especially those in the private
sector, can be more demanding. Cautious investors are a good thing: encouraging
investors’ due diligence helps prevent unsustainable municipal debt. Recently,
SEBI has promulgated additional requirements for continuing disclosure of
financial information, credit ratings, escrow accounts, interest accounts, sinking
fund accounts, and other matters.73 The need to comply with SEBI regulations with
respect to listed bonds, even though the requirements are not especially onerous,
adds procedural complexity, and this tends to push ULBs towards loans from banks
and state sponsored intermediaries, in preference to municipal bonds.
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Dr. Viral V. Acharya, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India - June 29, 2019,
https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1079
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The banking sector has been the biggest buyer of municipal bonds. The
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is responsible for banking supervision. Of the three
countries discussed in this article, India’s banking sector is probably the most
challenged by non-performing assets.74 State and nationally owned banks
predominate.75 As with most central banks, the RBI is increasingly pursuing a riskbased approach to banking supervision, consistent with Basel Principles, which
support market discipline for commercial banks. An implication of these principles
is that commercial banks, as deposit-taking institutions, will generally not be able
to invest a significant portion of their assets in long-term instruments, such as
municipal bonds. They may be able to handle 5 to 7-year tenors, but not 20 to 30year maturities. Obviously, ULBs can afford less total debt if their bonds and other
borrowings must be repaid more quickly.
Insurance companies and pension funds must treat municipal bonds
differently to government bonds. Both life insurers and pension funds have
actuarially calculated long term obligations, and could, in principle, match these
with long-term investments that are reasonably safe municipal bonds that yield a
predictable, long-term return. India’s Insurance Regulatory and Development
Authority (IRDA) regulates the investment of insurance funds and classifies
municipal bonds as “non-governmental securities” that need to be rated at least A+
to be eligible for inclusion in an insurance company’s investment portfolio. 76
Similarly, the Pension Fund Regulatory Development Authority has classified
municipal bonds as Asset Class C instruments (fixed income instruments other than
Government Securities), rather than Asset Class G instruments (central and state
government securities).77 Class C instruments require a minimum AA rating from
at least two rating agencies.78 Thus, for these two important classes of potential
municipal bond investors, municipal obligations are categorically disadvantaged.
74
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2. South Africa
In South Africa, the municipal bond market is about US $1.3 billion,79 out of a
total debt securities market of approximately US $234 billion.80 It is worth noting
that the municipal bond market has steadily been losing ground to direct lending,
with long-term loans to municipalities now at around US $3.62 billion. South
African municipal bond debt stands at about US $22 per capita, but note that this
is complemented by about US $62 in loan debt. Even the combined municipal loan
and bond debt is only about 1.3% of South African per capita GDP. This level of
long-term subnational debt,81 in relation to per capita GDP, is less than one tenth
of the Indian and levels. From this perspective, there is significant room for
sustainable expansion in the South African municipal bond and debt market.
As in India, South African municipal bonds are listed on the securities
exchange. Municipal bonds were listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa
(BESA) until 2009, when BESA was merged with the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange (JSE). Sovereign bonds, State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) bonds, corporate
bonds, and municipal bonds are now all listed on the JSE. All listed bonds must
comply with JSE’s Debt Listings Requirements. 82 These requirements are
generally the same for municipal bonds as for other bonds, with some exceptions
that take into account the timing for municipal financial statements preparation and
auditing. The JSE has recently added new requirements for disclosure of influential
persons and procurement practices.83 While the Debt Listing Requirements require
financial disclosure, there is no JSE requirement for municipal issuers to have
surplus income, as there is in India. Although municipal bonds are listed on the
JSE, trading is done bilaterally – after the parties reach an agreement, deals are
reported to the JSE for matching and settlement. 84
In addition to JSE listing requirements, national legislation requires
disclosure. There are two separate requirements, and failure to comply can have
serious consequences for the individuals involved. First, before any debt is
79

South African National Treasury, Municipal Borrowing Bulletin, Issue 14, September 2019

80

https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/9632/07Statistical
%20tables%20–%20Capital%20Market.pdf
81

Long term provincial debt in South Africa is negligible.

82

Available at https://www.jse.co.za/current-companies/issuer-regulation

83

Amendments to the JSE Debt Listings Requirements Part 2 of 2018, 30 April 2019

84

South African National Treasury, 2018 Financial Markets Review, page 26

Published by Reading Room, 2020

116

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 15

incurred, the municipality must make public an information statement setting out
the particulars of the proposed debt and any security to be provided, and must have
invited the public and the provincial and national treasuries to comment. 85 Second,
“[a]ny person involved in the borrowing of money by a municipality must, when
interacting with a prospective lender or when preparing documentation for
consideration by a prospective investor (a) disclose all information in that person’s
possession or within that person’s knowledge that may be material to the decision
of that prospective lender or investor; and (b) take reasonable care to ensure the
accuracy of any information disclosed.”86 These requirements are intended to
prevent any misrepresentation, and if failure to comply is deliberate or grossly
negligent, violation is a criminal offense. 87
Pension funds and mutual funds are restricted as to municipal bond
investments. Under Regulation 28,88 pursuant to the Pension Funds Act, a pension
fund may only invest in specified assets within defined issuer and aggregate limits.
With regard to debt securities, the aggregate limit for (on-balance sheet) bankissued, corporate and public entity debt combined is 75 %, with a sub-limit of 50%
for debt of listed companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and a per entity
limit of 10%. The term “public entity” here refers to entities subject to the Public
Finance Management Act (PFMA). This includes national and provincial entities,
but not municipalities, which are subject to the Municipal Finance Management
Act (MFMA). Because there is no specific category for municipalities, municipal
bonds come under the category “other debt instruments” and must be treated like
unlisted corporate debt, with a portfolio limit of 5% per entity and 25% overall.
This difference makes it difficult for municipal bonds to compete in a pension fund
portfolio, even in an era when many SOEs are in serious financial difficulty.
Similarly, under FSB Board Notice 90, pursuant to the Collective Investment
Schemes Control Act,89 there is a separate category for municipalities, but
aggregate limit is 20% for all municipal bonds, as compared to 100% for bonds
issued by entities subject to the PFMA. This means that a mutual fund (“unit trust”
in South African usage) could be invested 100% in SOE bonds but only 20% in
municipal bonds. These regulatory restrictions are not based on risk or
85
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performance, and unnecessarily limit the potential market for municipal bonds. In
contrast to the categorical approach used for pensions and mutual funds, insurers
base their asset allocation decisions on risk-based financial soundness 90 under a
new Solvency Assessment and Management framework. This approach avoids
both errors of including risky investments, and of excluding sound investments.
3. United States
In the U.S., state and local government debt accounts for just over US $3
trillion, or 4% of the total domestic market for debt instruments and loans, which
is about $75 trillion.91 This combined state and local debt comes to some $9,177
per capita, or 15% of US per capita GDP, which represents a long-term
commitment to infrastructure investment at the subnational level that is comparable
on an GDP-adjusted per capita basis to India, and more than 10 times the level in
South Africa.
Municipal bonds are not listed on an exchange, and issuers are not federally
regulated. U.S. municipal bonds are traded “over the counter” and thus are not
subject to listing requirements. Brokers, dealers, and municipal financial advisors
are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). National authority to regulate municipal
bond issuers is limited by principles of federalism (because local governments are
creatures of the states, the federal government cannot in general regulate their
actions). However, in 1975 the U.S. Congress used its authority under the
commerce clause of the Constitution to require municipal securities dealers to
register with the SEC.92 Registered dealers are regulated by the MSRB,93 a “selfregulatory organization” (SRO), which sets rules for dealers, subject to oversight
by the SEC.94 These rules require that underwriters in the primary market prepare
and file official statements, which are intended to prevent fraud and ensure
transparency. They require dealers to disclose to their customers all material facts
90
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which the dealer knows or which are reasonably accessible in the market. 95 Starting
in 1995, a requirement was added to for issuers to disclose updated information
throughout the term a municipal bond is outstanding.96 In 2010, after the global
financial crisis, Congress added a requirement that municipal financial advisors
must also register with the SEC and be regulated by the MSRB. Financial advisors
are under a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their municipal clients. Thus,
bond dealers and financial advisors, rather than municipalities directly, are
regulated.
Federal tax exemption plays a significant role in the U.S. municipal bond
market. Interest on municipal bonds is generally excluded from federal taxation
under the Internal Revenue Code. Originally, this exclusion was rooted in
constitutional concerns, and an early Supreme Court case contained dicta to the
effect that it would be unconstitutional to tax interest on state and local debt
obligations.97 However, by 1982, many municipalities had used their ability to
issue tax exempt debt to benefit private development, and public opinion had turned
against such practices. As one author noted, “K-Mart financed nearly 100 stores
between 1975 and 1980 with $220.5 million of tax-exempt small issues, while
McDonald's used small issues to open thirty-two new restaurants in 1979 in
Pennsylvania and Ohio alone.”98 In response to these perceived abuses, Congress
passed laws limiting the tax exemption for interest on municipal securities. The
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) 99 required issuers to
register their bonds and eliminated tax exemption for “small issues” which had been
used to finance a variety of small, private, businesses; the 1984 Deficit Reduction
Act (DEFRA)100 imposed an annual state-wide cap on tax-exempt private activity
issues; and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 restricted tax exemption for arbitrage

95

MSRB Rule G-17 requires dealers and municipal advisors to “deal fairly with all persons;” in
November 2019, the MSRB received SEC approval to amend and restate its Interpretive Notice
regarding the fair dealing obligations that underwriters owe to issuers under Rule G-17. See
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRBRules/General/~/media/CED78C17C33843EC8447405456771663.ashx?
96

Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12

97

Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429 (1895); because the Court struck down the
challenged Act on other grounds, this was dicta, but its caution was respected for nearly a century.
98

Bedtime for [Industrial Development] Bonds: Municipal Bond Tax Legislation of the First
Reagan Administration, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 213 (1985)
99

Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324

100

Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 611-648, 98 Stat. 494, 901-41

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/15

119

Glasser: Municipal Bonds in Three Countries

bonds.101 Debate continues, as it has for a century, over the tax exemption for
municipal bond interest. Opponents argue that the tax exemption is an inefficient
and perhaps ineffective way to subsidize state and local infrastructure
investment.102 Proponents argue that “if the tax exemption is eliminated or reduced,
states and localities will pay more to finance projects, leading to fewer projects and
fewer jobs, or project costs will be transferred to local tax and rate payers.” 103
Pension funds, insurers, and mutual funds actively invest in municipal bonds.
Instead of specifying categories and quantities of allowable investments, the U.S.
uses a prudent person standard. Under Federal law, pension fiduciaries are required
to invest “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use….”104 This permits investment in municipal bonds, and such
investments are common. U.S. insurers are mostly regulated at the state level, using
risk-based capital models, which also allow balanced investments in municipal
bonds. Property, casualty and life insurers all invest in municipal bonds. 105 U.S.
mutual funds invest extensively in municipal bonds, and some invest exclusively
in municipal bonds, selected on the basis of market timing, geography, quality, or
duration.106
STATUS AND PROSPECTS
1. India
India’s weak ULBs are unlikely to develop substantial demand. The lack of
demand for long term credit is logical given that most ULBs have limited powers
and functions, as well as limited and unpredictable revenues. ULBs have only such
powers as are delegated to them by the law in each state, and it is up to each state
to decide whether and how state revenues are shared with, and/or local revenue
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instruments authorized to, ULBs in its jurisdiction. 107 While there is state to state
variation, no Indian state has given ULBs a large degree of autonomy, especially in
comparison to municipalities in South Africa and the US. Residents of Indian cities
seem to have little expectation or confidence that their local government will
provide modern infrastructure or reliable services.
There have arguably been forty-one “municipal” bond issues since the
Bangalore Municipal Corporation issued the first municipal bond, with a state
guarantee, in 1997.108 This number counted as “municipal” bonds includes seven
non-ULB issuers, such as the Tamil Nadu State Government, the Tamil Nadu
Urban Development Fund, the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development
Authority, and several water and sewerage boards. Besides issuing bonds, ULBs
and other entities responsible for urban infrastructure also take loans from public
and private sector financial institutions, including state level funds and
intermediaries.
The size and tenor of municipal bond issues have been limited. In 1998,
Ahmedabad, a city of 5.6 million people, was the first municipal corporation in
India to issue municipal bonds without a government guarantee, in 1998, when it
borrowed a billion rupees.109 As of 2019, Ahmedabad has issued its fifth municipal
bond, in the amount of 2 billion rupees.110 The longest maturity for any municipal
bond in India appears to be 15 years, though 10 years or less is most common. From
2017, Indian municipal bond issuance is again showing signs of life, after a hiatus
of several years. Recent bond issues seem to have been stimulated by a 2% interest
subsidy from the union government, but the amounts remain small and ULB interest
in municipal bonds appears weak.
There are many factors contributing to weak ULB demand. Among these are
1) that commercial and subsidized loans (including loans from state-level
intermediaries)111 are often available to ULBs at equivalent or better interest rates,
and with less effort than it takes to issue a municipal bond; and 2) that central and
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state government transfer schemes have crowded out the demand for municipal
bonds.112 Recognizing the need to invest more in urban development, to lay a
foundation for continued economic growth, a variety of national and state schemes
have provided infrastructure grants to ULBs, especially since the $20 billion
JNNURM scheme was launched in 2005. By providing generous grants for local
infrastructure, these well-intentioned schemes have weakened the incentive for
ULBs to issue bonds.
State governments’ interest in strong ULBs is doubtful. While any state could
legally empower strong ULBs, giving them substantial functions and finances,
there are few incentives for state legislatures to do so, and no states have gone very
far in this direction. Some observers have described an anti-urban bias. 113 In most
states, a minority of legislators represent constituencies that are officially
“urban.”114 State legislatures therefore have little incentive to put significant
powers and financial resources in the hands of ULBs, given that they represent
alternative centres of power, whose leadership may come from opposition political
parties.
Rather than empower strong ULBs, states have created parallel financing
channels, using state-controlled entities that have planning and investment powers
within ULB boundaries.115 These include development authorities, industrial
development and investment corporations, water and sanitation enterprises, and
urban rail and transport authorities, and others. 116 These authorities typically
receive financial support from the state, and many have their own revenue
112
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instruments. Indeed, the biggest “municipal bond” to date was not issued by a
municipality at all, but rather by the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development
Authority, to support the development of Amaravati, the State’s new capital. 117
The Union Government has few regulatory handles. Although the Government
might like to encourage municipal borrowing and municipal bonds, the power of
ULBs to borrow, to bind successor councils, to set taxes, fees and charges at an
adequate level to service substantial debt, all depend entirely on State law. This
leaves the Union Government with limited ability to either empower or constrain
the issuance of municipal bonds. There has been discussion about a tax exemption
for municipal bond interest, based on the U.S. model, but that has not happened, 118
and it is far from clear that such an exemption would make a real difference. The
success of the U.S. model of local infrastructure financing does not lie in the
municipal bond as an instrument, nor in the tax exemption as a subsidy, but rather
in the expectations and trust that most citizens repose in their local government,
and that is very different from the reality in India. The Union Government has
attempted to encourage/incentivize ULBs to issue municipal bonds through the Atal
Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), which provided a
2% interest subsidy for bonds. Unfortunately, both the tax exemption and the
interest subsidy are based on “cargo cult” imitation of superficial aspects of the
U.S. municipal bond market, rather than a contextual and historical understanding
of how the U.S. market developed as it did, and why it currently functions as it
does. The U.S. interest rate subsidy is certainly part of the story, but it is not a
sufficient explanation for the growth of the municipal bond industry. A final aspect
of the Union Government’s approach to municipal bonds is that, through SEBI, it
has promulgated listing requirements for municipal bonds. This may have had the
paradoxical effect of raising entry barriers, and encouraging more loans, rather than
municipal bonds.
2. South Africa
South African municipalities have broad powers and functions with respect to
local matters, which include land use planning, streets and street lighting, public
transport, the provision of water and sanitation services, storm drainage, solid waste
117
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disposal, electrical distribution, and many other matters. 119 All municipalities have
broad discretion over property rates and tariffs for water and electricity, and a
constitutionally guaranteed equitable share of nationally raised revenues. 120 This
is a good starting point for a municipal bond market, but it has not proven to be
sufficient.
Only metropolitan municipalities (“metros”) have so far issued bonds, and not
all of them have done so. None of the smaller municipalities have issued bonds,
although many borrow in the form of loans. Metros generally have strong ownsource revenues and in the aggregate, they generate close to 90% of their revenues
from own-source instruments. Moreover, infrastructure grants from national
government to metros increased nearly six-fold over the ten-year period from the
2006 to the 2016.121 While the 8 metros have substantial borrowing capacity, they
also have limited incentive to borrow, given the substantial capital transfers they
have been receiving in recent years. In contrast to Indian ULBs, South Africa’s
metros, and many of its secondary city municipalities, have the revenues and
revenue instruments to be creditworthy, if they manage their fiscal affairs with
prudence and discipline. However, this potential has been translated into a growth
in real demand for long term investment capital.
The number of municipal bond issues in India and South Africa are similar,
as shown on the chart below:
Municipal Bonds issued in India and South Africa: 1998 to 2019
India
South Africa
122
Number of issues
26 to 41
24
Smallest bond issue
US $2.4 million
US $60.1 million
Largest issue
US $185.7 million
US $287.8 million
Note: USD equivalents are calculated as of the date of issue
The pool of potential South African bond issuers is much smaller than in India.
South Africa has at most 53 potential municipal issuers, whereas India has over
4,000 ULBs, as well as a wide variety of development authorities, water and
119
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sewerage boards, and other potential issuers. Notwithstanding this broad universe
of potential issuers, the total value of Indian municipal bonds to date is just over
US $1.2 billion, while the total value of South African municipal bonds issued to
date is US $2.8 billion.123 Per capita municipal bond issuance in South Africa is
more than 40 times the Indian level (and all of the South African issuers are actually
municipalities).
South African municipal borrowing is static in real terms. Over the last twenty
years, outstanding long-term municipal borrowing has changed little in real terms,
even though it has more than tripled in nominal terms.124 As old debt is retired, it
is replaced with new debt, but there has been no net growth in real terms. Over the
same time period, the proportion of municipal debt represented by municipal bonds
has dropped dramatically. Twenty years ago, almost all outstanding long term
municipal debt in South Africa was in the form of bonds. Today, loans account for
about 70%.125
In principle, South Africa has strong policies to enable municipal borrowing
from the private sector, whether in the form of bonds or loans. 126 This approach is
reflected, inter alia, in comprehensive national legislation,127 which regulates the
preparation and implementation of municipal budgets and financial statements,
short- and long-term borrowing, accountability for financial decisions, and many
other matters. South African municipalities may enter into long-term debt
obligations only for the purpose of “capital expenditure on property, plant or
equipment to be used for the purpose of achieving the objects of local government”
or, under specified conditions, for re-financing existing long-term debt. 128 A
municipal council must authorize the debt obligation after publishing notice and
inviting public comment, and no provincial or national government approval is
required. The legislation also includes provisions for provincial interventions in the
event of financial problems in municipalities.
123

Author’s calculations. Both figures are the aggregate of nominal values, not adjusted for
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Local government financial management policies are not always respected.
Despite MFMA requirements for realistic budgeting,129 many municipalities do not
collect all of the revenues they project in annual budgets, and are chronically short
of cash. This leads to substantial unpaid bills from suppliers, including public
entities that supply bulk water and electricity to municipalities for distribution.
Despite a clearly stated policy preference for attracting private sector finance, the
government has allowed significant growth in public sector lending to
municipalities. Legislative provisions for provincial intervention in the case of
financial problems have not always been followed. 130
3. United States
The U.S. is characterized by a profound decentralism. Although the powers and
functions of municipalities vary by state, there is a profound decentralism that
underlies American attitudes toward government. A basic trust in local political
leaders is basic to the American character, despite formal differences in legal
regimes. Some scholars have studied different U.S. states’ approaches based on
whether they follow “Dillon’s Rule” or “Home Rule” approaches but recent
scholarship points out that the actual level of local autonomy enjoyed by
municipalities in different states is not directly related to either Dillon’s Rule or
Home Rule.131 The autonomy enjoyed by local government in the U.S. suits the
people - in poll after poll for decades, around 70% of Americans trust their local
government.132 And it is local government that must bear the burden of investing
in local infrastructure.
Urbanization, growth and deterioration will drive continued demand for local
infrastructure. The population of the U.S. continues to grow and is expected to
reach some 434 million by the end of the century. 133 Long term economic growth
129
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is likely to continue. The U.S. is 82 percent urbanized, 134 and most urban
infrastructure is aging, and badly in need of updating, rehabilitation and
replacement. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) publishes an
“infrastructure report card” every four years. For the last two editions, 2013 and
2017, U.S. infrastructure has gotten a grade of D+.135 The 2017 report estimated
that the U.S. needs to spend some $4.5 trillion by 2025 to improve the its roads,
bridges, dams, airports, schools, and other infrastructure. No doubt actual
investment will fall short of these targets, but the demand is there, and the
overwhelming majority of the investment that is made will be funded by local
government, using municipal bonds.
Demand for infrastructure investment will drive the growth of the bond
market. The decentralized system of local infrastructure investment in the U.S. is
deeply embedded. It is based in the localism of citizens’ expectations, in the habits
of municipal officials, in the vested interests of underwriters, bond dealers, rating
agencies, fund managers, and other capital market institutions. From 1812 until the
present day, the U.S. municipal bond market has grown steadily. Episodic market
regulation has come in reaction to problems and abuses, but has never threatened
the core business model of financing local infrastructure through the issuance of
municipal bonds. One lesson to take from this may be that a regulatory framework
alone cannot drive market development. The impetus to use borrowing to build
infrastructure originates not in the regulations, but in the aspirations of citizens and
civic leaders to build their cities. Borrowing is a means to infrastructure
investment, and such investment is seen as the key to building great cities. The
dreams of urban residents and businesses demand investment, and local political
systems have evolved to meet those demands.
CONJECTURES
Context is critical. Municipal bonds have been successful as a means of financing
urban infrastructure in the U.S., and continue to finance two-thirds of urban
infrastructure investment. It is natural that other countries have sought to emulate
this model. And, it would be a mistake to extract a specific tool from its context,
and expect it to work in the same way in a very different context. U.S. municipal
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bonds work as they do because of historical, institutional, legislative and political
factors that are different from those in India or South Africa. The investors are
different, and the borrowers are different. The challenge in seeking to learn from
the U.S. experience is to discern which contextual factors are most relevant, and
what differences may be most limiting.
Bonds and loans both deserve attention. In all three countries, arguments for the
wise use of local borrowing to finance urban infrastructure are well-known:
residents and businesses can benefit from economic and social infrastructure today,
and cities can spread the capital cost over many years and include future users as
part of the financing plan. Cities can repay their borrowing in part from the
economic returns on infrastructure and social investments being financed.
Borrowing from the private sector allows local government to leverage current
resources, and to invest in more infrastructure, more quickly, than could be done
otherwise. These advantages are not unique to municipal bonds. Loans can achieve
the same benefits, if they are long-term and tap into private sector sources of capital.
Both bonds and loans can be tailored to meet specific needs. 136 Although municipal
bonds are of perennial interest in both India and South Africa, it is not obvious that
they are preferable to loans, especially from municipal borrowers’ perspectives.
Loans tend to have fewer transaction costs, and can be more easily crafted to meet
the specific needs of borrowers and institutional lenders. Whether at the local and
practical level, or at the state or national policy level, a conversation about financing
local infrastructure should not be limited to municipal bonds.
Building a market requires a long-term perspective. One advantage of bonds is
liquidity, and liquidity requires a market. The U.S. has an active municipal bond
market, with a significant volume of daily trades. This arguably leads to the
allocative efficiency and price discovery we associate with capital markets
generally. The evolution of an active bond market takes time, and it takes volume.
Although a number of municipal bonds have been brought to market in both India
and South Africa, the volume of outstanding bonds in both countries is quite small,
and insufficient to support a liquid market. Notably, this is in contrast to the market
for sovereign bonds in both countries. While individual municipalities looking to
borrow are naturally interested in the best deal they can find at the time they want
to borrow, national level policy-makers may have a longer-term perspective, and
may see an advantage in encouraging the development of a municipal bond market
for a variety of reasons. Doing so requires a systemic approach, patience and
flexibility. Supporting individual bond issues is unlikely to lead to a market. The
136

Some kinds of public private partnerships can also finance public infrastructure in much the
same way as a bond or a loan.

Published by Reading Room, 2020

128

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 15

emerging municipal bond markets in India and South Africa are each tiny in
comparison the U.S. market, but we must remember that the U.S. market has a 200year head-start. The U.S. municipal bond market sits at the intersection of two
systems: a system of capital markets that has evolved since the birth of the nation,
and an approach to infrastructure finance that involves deep-seated faith in
localism, and a general trust in local institutions.
Investors and bondholders – the supply side of capital. India and South Africa
are blessed and cursed with public sector financial institutions that invest in
municipal debt instruments, including loans and bonds. In hard times, these public
lenders can invest in municipal debt that might not be attractive to the private sector.
But these institutions, and their instinct for self-preservation, can crowd out private
sector efforts to finance local infrastructure. In both India and South Africa,
institutional investors’ (mutual fund/unit trust, insurance, pension funds) interest in
municipal bonds is limited to some degree by government regulations that treat
municipal bonds unfavourably in comparison to sovereign instruments. Households
and individuals in India and South Africa do not have ready access to municipal
bonds as investments, and are not familiar with them. In South Africa, few
individuals with significant resources are prepared to invest in municipal bonds –
the reputation of all spheres of government has suffered as many state owned
enterprises have been mismanaged and some have become insolvent. In India,
wealthy individuals seem to have less faith in financial instruments than in hard
assets such as real estate and precious metals. By contrast, in the U.S., middle class
and wealthy individuals have a long-standing willingness to invest in municipal
bonds. For generations, municipal bonds been seen as relatively safe and sensible
long-term investment instruments, well-suited to saving for children’s college
education or retirement. To build such individual and household interest in India
or South Africa would take a confluence of substantive and marketing efforts, but
could eventually mobilize substantial additional capital for the public good.
Local governance and sustainable borrowing – the demand side. When local
government borrows, it borrows on behalf of its people. They must ultimately pay
the debt. The demand for infrastructure and the sustainability of borrowing depends
on a fundamentally sound social contract between local government and the people.
Weaknesses in local governance in India and South Africa limit the demand side of
the market. In the case of India, ULBs are legally, institutionally and financially
weak, and few people have confidence in their local government institutions. South
African municipalities have more power and more reliably revenues, but they also
lack the confidence of their citizens. To the extent active citizen participation is
evident in either India or South Africa, it often involves wealthy and/or politically
connected individuals and groups who bend local government to their own
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purposes. Local government borrowing without the confidence of the people can
eventually backfire.
Indians have limited involvement with local government. Politically active
Indian citizens seem more occupied with national, state, and ethnic issues than with
local urban development. One author tells us that “while voters may reward or
punish incumbents for their public service delivery, they vote for other reasons as
well (e.g., caste, religion, patronage benefits, party leader’s charisma), and in any
case, a vote could at best express a desire for improved services generally, not for
some particular service….”137 Local issues such as inclusive growth and spatial
development, and what those things demand in terms of infrastructure investment,
do not attract much attention in the press or in social media. This may be because
ULBs have little power, or it may be that citizens do not think they can have much
impact. Expectations of ULBs are low, urban service delivery and infrastructure are
sub-optimal, and this low-level equilibrium will be difficult to shift. 138
South Africans have little faith in local government. While the legal framework
provides many mechanisms for citizen participation, these are not used or trusted
by the masses. In one survey, citizens were asked how much they trust their elected
local government council. More than 40% responded “not at all,” and another 24%
said “just a little.” Only 14% said they trusted their council “a lot.” 139 One South
African scholar has written “that for as long as participatory local governance
mechanisms are inefficient, and disconnected from the needs, goals, and capacity
of local citizens, the various tensions and conflict between citizens and local
municipalities in South Africa will continue unabated.” 140 The lack of faith in local
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government leads frustrated citizens to dramatic and sometimes violent street
protests, which are often covered by media in a way that de-legitimizes the
underlying concerns.141
Most Americans have a general trust in local government. A 2018 Gallup
report found that 72% of U.S. adults have a "great deal" or a "fair amount" of trust
in their local government.142 This is not unanimous or unquestioning trust, but it is
a higher level of trust than state or national government enjoy. “Citizens are willing
and able to trust city councils and their own voice to come to rational borrowing
and investment decisions, and are willing to put the volunteer time into committees
and processes that develop land use policies, capital improvement priorities, and
budget plans for local government.”143 The American success with municipal
bonds probably has much to do with the autonomy and accountability of
municipalities. In genuine and sometimes contentious dialogue with citizens,
councillors determine the services to provide, and they set taxes and fees sufficient
to pay for those services. These habits are rooted in the historical resourcefulness
of U.S. cities. Cities borrowed, beginning 200 years ago, because they had to
borrow – no one else was going to pay for local infrastructure. State governments
were weak and sometimes far away. The national government was also weak, and
still further away. Neither was or is trusted as much as local government. Habits
of local self-reliance developed, which continue to guide the way people think
about local government finances and infrastructure investment.
Municipal bonds are simple, markets are complex. As Indian and South African
municipalities have experienced, it is not difficult to issue a municipal bond of
modest size with a 10 to 15-year maturity. But in both countries, a direct loan is
more common, and that is not likely to change unless the capital markets offer better
deals. From a national policy perspective, a municipal bond market might seem to
offer advantages in terms of efficiency and financial discipline, but can be a real
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challenge to influence all of the inputs that ultimately determine the growth or
shrinkage of the bond market. South Africa’s bond market has been shrinking
steadily in real terms, even as municipal borrowing for infrastructure has remained
steady. India’s municipal bond market is much smaller, even though the country is
much bigger. The bulk of urban infrastructure in India is driven by states and their
agencies, rather than by ULBs, and this seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future.
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